Abstract-The problem of detecting encrypted information flows using timing information is considered. An information flow consists of both information-carrying packets and irrelevant packets called chaff. A relay node can perturb the timing of information-carrying packets as well as adding or removing chaff packets. The goal is to detect whether there is an information flow through certain nodes of interest by analyzing the transmission times of these nodes. Under the assumption that the relay of information-carrying packets is subject to a bounded delay constraint, fundamental limits on detection are characterized as the minimum amount of chaff needed for an information flow to mimic independent traffic. A detector based on the optimal chaff-inserting algorithms is proposed. The detector guarantees detection in the presence of an amount of chaff proportional to the total traffic size; furthermore, the proportion increases to 100% exponentially fast as the number of hops on the flow path increases.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Consider a wireless ad hoc network illustrated in Fig 1, where multiple source-destination pairs are communicating along certain routes. Suppose that we do not trust any nodes in the network, and nor do we know the routing protocol.
Furthermore, assume that all the packets are reencrypted at every relay node so that the only observation we can obtain is the transmission times of the nodes. Under these constraints, we want to know how information is transmitted in the network.
Suppose we deploy eavesdroppers in the network to record node transmission times'. The through S or R will cause noise in the detection because the measurements SI and S2 will conitaini transmissionis not belonging to the information flow of interest. Another source of noise is dummy packets actively inserted by S or R to evade detection. Both multiplexed traffic and dummy traffic are called chaff noise.
A. Related Work
The problem of detecting information flows has mainly been addressed in the framework of intrusion detection. In 1995, Staniford and Heberlein [1] first considered the problem of stepping-stone detection. The key problem in stepping-stone detection is to reconstruct the intrusion path by analyzing various characteristics of the attacking traffic. Related work in the literature only considers pair-wise detection.
Early detection techniques are based on the content of the traffic; see, e.g., [1] , [2] . To deal with encrypted traffic, timing characteristics are used in detection, such as the On Off detec tion by Zhang and Paxson [3] , the deviation-based detection by Yoda and Etoh [4] , and tbe packet interarrival-based detection by Wang et al. [5] . The drawback of these approaches is that they are vulnerable to active timing perturbation by the attacker.
Donoho et all [6] were the first to consider bounded delay perturbation. They showed that if packet delays are bounded by a maximum amount, then it is possible to distinguish traffic containing information flows from independent traffic. Their work was followed by several practical detectors, including the watermark-based detector by Wang and Reeves [7] and the counting-based detector by Blum et al. [8] .
The problem becomes much more challenging when chaff can be inserted. In such cases, there are only incomplete solutions in the literature, e.g., [6] , [8]- [10] . Donoho et al. [6] showed that there will be notable difference between information flows and independent traffic if chaff traffic is independent of the flows of information-carrying packets. Peng et al. [9] and Zhang et al. [10] separately proposed active and passive packet-matching schemes which can detect information flows if chaff packets only appear in the outgoing traffic of the relay node. Blum et al. [8] modified their counting-based detector to handle a limited number of chaff packets at the cost of an increased false alarm probability.
B. Summary of Results and Organization
We consider the problem of detecting information flows in a wireless ad hoc network by measuring transmission times of the nodes of interest. Assuming that the relay of informationcarrying packets is subject to bounded delay perturbation, we make detection based on the difference between the transmission patterns of information flows and independent traffic. The main challenge is that our measurements may contain chaff packets. Our goal is to investigate the limits of timing-based detection in the presence of arbitrarily inserted chaff noise and develop detectors which can tolerate a significant amount of chaff.
The main contribution of this paper is a general form of detector which is designed specifically to provide guaranteed detection in the presence of chaff noise. Although previous work (e.g. [6] ) has claimed that detection is always possible if chaff noise and the information-carrying packets are independent, we have shown in [1 1] that with arbitrarily inserted chaff, there are limits on the amount of chaff noise beyond which no timing-based detector can work well. In this paper, we develop a threshold detector based on the optimal chaffinserting algorithms. The detector guarantees detection of all the information flows with fractions of chaff bounded by the detection threshold. We prove that the detector has vanishing false alarm probability as long as its threshold is smaller than the minimum fraction of chaff needed to mimic independent traffic. The proposed detector is shown to be optimal in dealing with chaff noise; in particular, as the length of the flow path increases, the tolerable fraction of chaff noise increases to one exponentially.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formulates the problem. Section III characterizes the fundamental limits on timing-based detection. Section IV presents an information flow detector together with its performance 2We consider arbitrarily inserted chaff noise because it is the most difficult to handle. If (part of) the chaff noise is from multiplexed traffic on different paths, tben it m-nay be subject to certain constraints, and our analyss will provide lower bounds on the detection performance.
analysis. Then Section V concludes the paper with a few comments.
II 8We denote false alarm probability by PF(-) and miss probability by [6] claimed that it is possible to detect information flows with arbitrary CTR; their claim, however, is based on the assumption that the chaff processes are independent of the processes of information-carrying packets.
B. Limits on Detecting Multi-hop Flows
In Section III-A, we have established a fundamental limit on pairwise detection. In this section, we extend the results to multi-hop information flows and show that it becomes increasingly difficult to hide an information flow as the length of the flow path increases. Our approach is parallel to that for 2-hop flows. We first develop an optimal chaff-inserting algorithm for multi-hop information flows and then analyze the CTR of that algorithm.
To insert chaff into an n-hop flow (n > 2), we extend BGM to a recursive greedy algorithm called "Multi-Bounded-DelayRelay" (MBDR). Given (Si)' 1 Note that for n = 2, MBDR is equivalent to BGM. A direct implementation of MBDR has complexity 0 ( (AA) i S ), where A is the maximum rate of SI ,-, S. The complexity can be reduced to O(n2281 1) by expanding the recursiorns, see [12] In [II], we developed a chaff-inserting algorithm called "Greedy-Relay-Embedding" (GRE). It can be shown that MBDR and GRE are equivalent except that GRE does not contain recursions. Algorithm GRE has been shown in [11] to find the largest number of matched packets, or equivalently, the minimum number of chaff packets. Therefore, MBDR is optimal.
Let CTRMBDI(t; to) be the CTR of the n-hop information flow (5,) .n=l = (X @Wi),n= partitioned by MBDR. It is proved in [111] that if Si (i 1, ..., n) are independent Poisson processes of maximum rate1 A, then the asymptotic fraction of information-carrying packets found by GRE is upper bounded by (1 --AA)n-1, i.e., with probability one, lim CTRMBDIR(t; to) > 1 -(1 -e ) t oo (2) Suppose that under Ho, Si's are jointly independent Poisson processes with rate up to A. Then by (2) and the optimality of MBDR, we see that CTR* > 1-(Ie >A)o As n oc, CTRr 1 exponentially fast. Therefore, the information flow will eventually be saturated with chaff as the length of the flow path increases, indicating that it is almost impossible to hide information flows with arbitrarily long paths.
IV INFORMATION FLOW DETECTOR
Having established the fundamental limits on detection, we hope to develop detectors to achieve these limits In this section, we present a general form of detector and analyze its performance.
We propose to detect information flows by a threshold detector based on the optimal chaff-inserting algorithms. Given (sy n [to, to + t]) < (n > 2), the detector is defined as'2 is based on the CTR of the optimal chaff-inserting algorithm and is adjusted (by ignoring chaff in Si n [to, to + (i -1)i))
to take into account the packets stored at the relay nodes initially, it is guaranteed to be no larger than the actual CTR in the measurements. Therefore by making decisions based on CTR'(t; to). we make sure that it is possible to evade detection only if the information flow contains more than fraction of chaff packets; equivalently, the detector has no miss detection for up to T,, fraction of chaff.
The threshold needs to be chosen to guarantee vanishing false alarm probability. For pairwise detection, we prove the following result. The parameter e represents a tradeoff between the chaff tolerance and the false alarm probability. A larger e leads to faster decaying false alarm probability but less tolerance of chaff whereas a smaller e enables more chaff tolerance Here o-1 denotes H, and 6) 0 denotes Ho.
at the cost of more false alarms. In particular, as e 0, the chaff tolerance of the proposed detector converges to the fundamental limit. Therefore, the detector is optimal in the sense that it provides the maximum chaff tolerance.
Note that although CTR* (n > 2) is unknown, one can choose the threshold by Tn = 1-(1 _ N-AI) n to guarantee exponentially decaying false alarm probability.
V. CONCLUSION This paper presents an information flow detector which has the maximum tolerance of arbitrarily inserted chaff noise. We point out that although the detailed analysis is done for independent Poisson processes, the detector also applies to other types of traffic except that the threshold may need adjustment. The proposed detector coupled with capacity constraints between neighbor nodes can capture all the longlived information flows with positive rate and sufficiently long paths.
VI. APPENDIX A. Proof of Theorem 3.1
Sequentially match packets in SI with those in S2 and let Yi be the delay of the ith packet, i.e., Yi =52 (4) 
